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 The Wrong War: 




 General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1951 called 
America's deepening involvement in the Korean conflict, "the wrong war, at the wrong place, at 
the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”
1
 He was concerned that the U.S. had entered the 
war without sufficient consideration of its consequences, and that the widening commitments 
there might distract from the more important military task of deterring possible Soviet attacks in 
Western Europe. For almost everyone involved, the Korean War was indeed the wrong war:  
something they did not want, that they participated in only reluctantly. Engaged in a bruising 
political fight over the "loss" of the Kuomintang regime on the Chinese Mainland, the Truman 
Administration felt compelled to resist communist "aggression." The French and British went 
along in Korea in order for the sake of the infant Atlantic Alliance. The new Chinese leaders, 
having just won their revolution, hardly needed a major war, but could not countenance Western 
troops on their Yalu River border. Several times the war drove the two regimes on the Korean 
peninsula to near-collapse. After three years of grinding destruction, both sides were forced to 
settle for essentially the status quo ante bellum. The war was thus both profound tragedy and 
horrifying proxy for World War III.
2
   
 For the Soviet Union, the Korean Conflict was definitely the wrong war. Officially 
neutral, the Soviets nonetheless were vilified by both sides. U.S. officials saw Stalin as the 
puppet master for the Communist side, while the Chinese resented being the water carrier for the 
socialist camp and (along with their North Korean allies) grumbled about inadequate Soviet 
supply efforts.  A newly minted superpower, the Soviet Union was reduced to handwringing 
from the sidelines, in constant fear of confrontation with America. Believing his junior ally, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), would have little trouble defeating the 
U.S.-backed Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south, Soviet leader Josef Stalin apparently gave 
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his consent to a DPRK attack. Miscalculating possible U.S. responses, he quickly distanced 
himself from the war, while seeking a negotiated end to the potentially threatening conflict. He 




 Since the conflict ended, the genesis of the war has been viewed in scholarly literature 
from at least three different points of view. Until the 1970s, the prevailing view held that the war 
was planned in Moscow and heavily supported by Beijing, and began with an unprovoked attack 
by the North. Decisions were taken within the realm of high politics, i.e., they were driven 
primarily by concerns for national interests and national security. Revisionists in the 1980s, 
influenced by the Vietnam War experience, asserted that the conflict was part of an ongoing 
Korean civil war, and that the North Koreans did not depend greatly on their Russian and 
Chinese allies in the opening stages. Revisionist scholarship focused more on domestic factors 
than international relations in decision making. The release of Russian and Chinese documents in 
the 1990s returned attention to the centrality of high level decision making, as it added nuance 
and shading to earlier images of the war. Stalin, Mao, and Kim indeed made most of the key 
decisions that led to war, but recent literature on the war, notably by Sergei Goncharov, et al. and 
Kathryn Weathersby, suggest that a more nuanced approach focused on key leaders provides the 
best insights into how the decisions were made.
4
 
 How were the key decisions that shaped the war taken? Were nation-state, bureaucratic, 
or individual actors most important? This article indicates that, in the Korean case, Stalin was the 
key decision maker, and only he had the power to determine whether war would be launched. 
Mao and Kim were secondary players, the former through his endorsement of the attack, and 
Kim through his constant urging of forceful reunification of Korea from 1949 onward.  This 
analysis thus indicates the importance of key communist leaders in conflict decision making 
during the early Cold War.   
 Understanding the origins of the Korean national division can help illuminate North 
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Korea’s postwar development, the conditions under which the Soviets intervened in localized 
wars, and the nature of such intractable conflicts. Using Korean War studies written since the 
conflict, this article examines the Soviet role in the Korean War, from the initial division of the 
country in the late 1940s through the armistice in 1953. It asserts that the Soviet role was more 
nuanced and ambiguous than thought at the time; Soviet leadership illustrated strongly realist 
thinking on issues of national interest. It approved the conflict in its opening phase, encouraged 
prolongation of war during intermediate stages, but then sought ways to end the war when it 
became a burden for post-Stalinist foreign policy. After the death of Stalin in early 1953, the 
Soviet leaders thought that improving relations with the West was more important than 
continuing the Korean conflict.  
 
 
The Roots of Conflict and NSC-68 
 
 Korea had been an area of vital strategic interest to the Russian Empire and later the 
Soviet Union from at least the end of the nineteenth century. During World War II, Soviet 
intentions in Korea were simple: short of outright domination, Stalin had as a maximum 
objective control of at least the northern segment as a border buffer. At a minimum, he would 
settle for influence in Korea through a strong Communist Party.
5
 Korea originally surfaced as a 
minor issue at wartime Allied political conferences, when it was initially yielded to Soviet 
control. The finally agreed-upon division of Korea into Soviet and American sectors of 
occupation was done in a very haphazard manner. Lacking a trusteeship agreement, and unable to 
land in Korea due to the suddenness of the Japanese capitulation in August, 1945, U.S. War 
Department officials proposed splitting the peninsula at the 38th Parallel in order to "place the 
capital city [Seoul] in the American zone" and prevent a total Soviet takeover.
6
 Stalin accepted 
the demarcation at once to maintain good relations with the Americans and perhaps obtain a quid 
pro quo concerning Allied occupation of Japan. Only this restraint prevented the total Soviet 
occupation of the peninsula.
7
    
3
Campbell: The Wrong War
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository, 2014
 
 
 The American and Soviet positions in Korea hardened, in part, because they were 
preoccupied with swiftly moving events in the Middle East and, especially, Central Europe.  From 
the beginning of the Cold War, America saw Soviet attempts to control Korea in regional and 
global terms. By 1949, the apocalyptic linking of Europe and Asia, China and Russia hardened 
into NSC-68, the blueprint for America’s global containment strategy.
8
 Cold War policy had 
been made on an ad hoc, reactive basis since the Greek Crisis in 1947. Truman used each new crisis 
during the first years of the Cold War to extend U.S. policy incrementally. Meanwhile, a major 
bureaucratic battle between George Kennan and Paul Nitze over the nature of Containment 
preoccupied policymakers. Kennan envisioned Containment as operating at vital chokepoints in 
defense of key U.S. interests, while Nitze called for global containment of communism wherever it 
threatened to succeed. NSC-68 was a “fundamental policy reassessment” done in the light of the 
“loss” of China and explosion of the Soviet bomb, both in 1949. It viewed communism as a 
“coordinated global movement,” and so cast aside any differentiation of central and peripheral 
interests. It also called for tripling of U.S. defense spending to counter the communist threat. U.S. 
President Harry S Truman had not accepted the document’s recommendations by the outbreak of 
the Korean War, but then quickly changed his mind and endorsed them. Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson noted that the war shifted the NSC-68 recommendations from theory to “immediate 
budget issues.” Some have charged that U.S. policymakers set the whole thing up, and maneuvered 
the communists into attacking South Korea, but John Lewis Gaddis contends that there is no 
“convincing evidence” of this assertion.
9
   
The Creation of Two Koreas 
 The Americans and Soviet positions in Korea hardened, in part, because they were 
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preoccupied with swiftly moving events in the Middle East and, especially, Central Europe.  
Both the U.S. and Soviet Union stayed in Korea in the late 1940s, with “neither side prepared to 
withdraw for fear that the other might not.” The Korean standoff also showed the degree to 
which “peripheries can manipulate centers,” as both superpowers settled on despots that seemed 
best able to restore order.
10
 The Soviets entered Korea much better prepared than the Americans 
for the task of administering the strongly nationalistic land.  Throughout the war, they had kept 
close relations with indigenous Korean communists. The Soviets employed a number of Korean 
Soviet citizens, and there were up to 100,000 Korean cadres and guerrillas operating out of 
Siberia.
11
 However, Soviet commander Col. General Ivan Chistiakov apparently had no set 
blueprint for the takeover when his forces moved into the peninsula, and used whoever was 
willing to help consolidate control, including non-Communists and Christians.
12
 The Soviets 
also relied heavily on the local "people's committees" that had sprung up at the end of the war, a 
leftist force not directly under their control.
13
 The early months of Soviet control were 
accordingly marked by caution, resulting in a greater degree of local autonomy than in Eastern 
Europe.
14
 Throughout their occupation, the Soviets generally respected indigenous Korean 
practices, and tolerated a regime much closer in style to the coalition politics of Yugoslavia than 
to the rigidly Stalinized states of Eastern Europe, and as close in sympathy with the Chinese 
Communists as with their Russian comrades.
15
 Perhaps the Soviets felt less threatened by a more 
flexible regime on the Asian periphery than on their much-invaded western frontier.  
 From the beginning, though, the Soviets seem to have settled on 33-year-old Kim Il Sung 
to head the North Korean state. Kim's early career involved connections with both anti-Japanese 
guerrillas and the Soviet Red Army. The Soviets brought him to the North in October, 1945, 
believing him capable of forming a "pliant, obedient elite" that would not cause any trouble for 
the Soviet Union.
16
 In 1946 and 1947, Kim began to use his growing control of the North's army 
to dominate the Korean Workers' (i.e., Communist) Party and eliminate non-communist 
opposition. Nonetheless, Kim's group ruled in concert with indigenous and pro-Chinese 
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communists. Even under occupation, Kim used no more than 200 Soviet advisors in the years 
prior to the Korean Conflict.
17
 Kim did not entirely trust his powerful Soviet comrades, as he 
may have feared incorporation into the Soviet empire, à la Eastern Europe and desired greater 
autonomy. Due to guerrilla ties, he often found it easier to work with the Chinese.
18
   
 Although the Soviets granted a measure of internal control to Kim, they negotiated 
directly with the U.S. over the future of Korea, but those negotiations went essentially nowhere.  
Hoping to use international means to consolidate a friendly regime, the Soviets formally accepted 
the notion of trusteeship at a Moscow Foreign Ministers conference in December, 1945. Due to 
South Korean opposition to the trusteeship idea, the U.S. backed away from its prior support, just 
as the previously lukewarm Soviets embraced it.  
 Meanwhile, talks on economic cooperation between the two zones accomplished little.  
As in Eastern Europe, the Soviets stripped the North of industrial hardware left over from the 
colonial period.  Next, the Joint Commission to determine conditions for Korean reunification 
broke down in mid-1946 over the issue of which organizations to consult on unification elections. 
 The Soviets wanted to exclude any groups opposed to trusteeship, effectively most South 
Korean non-communist groups, because the U.S. was backing the conservative regime of 
Syngman Rhee (Lee Sung Man) in the South. Excluding these groups, they felt, provided the 
only way to unify the country under a friendly regime. The Americans understandably rejected 
the Soviet proposal, and the Joint Commission stalled. Reconvened the next year, the 
commission could not get beyond this impasse.
19
 Soviet General Shtikov suggested joint 




 Blocked on the commission, and now linking Korea to developments in Europe, the U.S. 
in 1947 proposed creation of a U.N. commission to oversee unification elections to be held in 
May, 1948. A resolution to that effect passed the General Assembly, and a commission was 
dispatched to Korea. The Soviets refused to participate in subsequent elections, believing them a 
6
International Social Science Review, Vol. 88 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol88/iss3/1
 
ploy to unite Korea under Rhee, and encouraged leftist resistance to elections in the southern 
zone. As a result, these elections produced a U.N.-approved regime only in the South, i.e., the 
ROK under Rhee.
21
 The Soviets and Kim promptly held their own people's committee elections, 
leading to establishment of the DPRK in September, 1948.
22
 Having eliminated all opposition in 
the North, and working with southern Communists, Kim would have had an excellent chance to 
win the U.N. elections. However, the Soviets may have linked U.S. moves in Korea with 
Anglo-American cooperation in Germany and American hegemony in Japan, and so felt elections 
too risky at that time.
23
 
 From that point on, and until the outbreak of war, neither the Soviets nor the Americans 
seriously considered further negotiations on Korea's ostensibly temporary status. The hardening 
of the American position related to the ongoing debate over containment within the Truman 
administration,
24
 while the Soviet stance was powerfully connected to geopolitics in the Asian 
region, i.e., 1) control of North Korea allowed them to strengthen their position in Manchuria, 2) 
U.S. troops in the South still were a potential threat to Soviet territory, and 3) tight U.S. control 
of nearby Japan raised the possibility of a future American-Japanese alliance in Asia.
25
   
 The DPRK safely launched, Soviet forces withdrew from the North in January, 1949,
26
 
and American forces left the South in June of that year; both superpowers left behind 
detachments of advisors. In the last year before the conflict, periodic attention focused on a series 
of border incidents along the 38th parallel, accompanied by repeated invasion threats from both 
sides, especially from the South.
27
 Events in Korea were largely overshadowed by the successful 
Communist revolution in China. The unexpectedly quick rise of a huge new communist power 







Conventional Approaches.  Few things were as shrouded in mystery during the Cold War as 
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the actual role, if any, of the Soviets in the North Korean attack across the 38th parallel on June 
25, 1950. At the time, most Western observers accepted President Truman's assertion that it had 
been ordered by the Kremlin and represented "the ultimate Stalinist subversion and affront.”
29
  
According to conventional thought, the attack must have been Soviet-directed because it was so 
well-planned and because no one believed that North Koreans would resist Russian orders.  
There have been a number of variations on this theme in the literature. For instance, some 
observers contended that Soviets planned and directed the war effort "as a means of 
counteracting the Americans' unilateral move to conclude a separate peace with Japan,” as the 
Soviets feared erection of an Asian NATO and the rehabilitation of Japanese militarism enough 
to approve drastic action to force Japan's neutralization.
30
 Success in Korea might both 
intimidate the Japanese and force the U.S. to agree to a demilitarized Japan. Alternatively, the 
U.S. would increase her commitment to Japan by reducing her presence in Europe, and the 
Soviets might thereby increase their overall influence in East Asia.
31
 Others have suggested the 
Soviets were thinking in purely military terms. With the pending reversion of Soviet bases at 
Dalian and Port Arthur to China, the warm water ports of South Korea may have beckoned. All 
in all, the operation promised "great advantages...with minimal risks.”
32
 
 Another variation on conventional explanations comes from the realist school of 
international relations. The attack, realists assert, was purely a matter of power politics.  It 
suggests that Acheson's much commented-on speech to the National Press Club in February, 
1950, which neglected to include Korea within the U.S. East Asia defensive perimeter, convinced 
Stalin an invasion would "permit a relatively inexpensive North Korean unification of the 
country" or "an easy tidying-up operation.”
33
 The U.S. would not respond to the attack because 
the prevailing desire in Washington to pull back from the Asian mainland (prevalent in the 
Defense Dept.). Stalin miscalculated the American response, they add, by not realizing that war 
would force a U.S. policy reevaluation and the acceptance of a minority activist viewpoint 
(represented by the State Dept.).
34
 Other variants stress Soviet desire to reassert their leadership 
8
International Social Science Review, Vol. 88 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol88/iss3/1
 
in the Communist world because of the advent of the People's Republic of China (PRC), or to 
boost their reputation in Asia through forceful Korean reunification.
35
 Still others lay the blame 
at the feet of "tragic" and confused American foreign policy of the early Cold War period, which 




Revisionist Approaches.  Revisionist perspectives on Kim's attack began to challenge the 
conventional view in the 1960s. Famed China hand Edgar Snow thought the Soviets supported 
the attack to drive a permanent wedge between China and the U.S.
37
 Some revisionists think that 
superpower division of the peninsula in 1945 only postponed resolution of pent-up conflict, but 
could not prevent an eventual explosion. In fact, they almost echo official DPRK rationalization 
of the attack as retaliation for a ROK attack the same day.
38
 Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings 
insist that finding fault for the attack is irrelevant, since the real Korean War was a civil war 
between rightists and the Left that began in 1945. The full-blown conflict of 1950 grew out of 
guerrilla wars in the South and border incidents in 1949-1950, which they say were in turn 
determined by the issues of independence and unification.
39
 Cumings also insists that Acheson’s 
speech omission of Korea was intentional, as he did not wish to reveal secret military agreements 
with the Rhee regime.
40
   
 Cumings massive study of the war’s origins does not discuss Soviet or Chinese decision 
making in detail, and has only a little to say about Stalin’s thought processes. He seems far more 
interested in the process by which the conflict became a “war for containment,” i.e., ratifying the 
containment strategy set out in NSC-68, and then a “war for rollback” of Communism.
41
 Thus, 
he assesses Soviet-North Korean and Chinese-North Korean interactions only generally: the 
DPRK was never a “docile” Communist regime à la Eastern Europe, pro-Soviet Communists 
were never numerous in the DPRK hierarchy, and Pyongyang followed a much more autarkic 
economic policy than did the Soviets. Cumings says that North Koreans came to view the Soviets 
as only marginally helpful in their struggle against, first, the Japanese, and then the South 
9
Campbell: The Wrong War
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository, 2014
 




 Having shared the revolutionary struggle in northern China, the North Korean leadership 
was closer in outlook to Mao and his associates. Kim “shrewdly” sent some of his best troops to 
fight in China, and in doing so, got a safe staging area, removed the Chinese Nationalists as 
potential enemies, and made the victorious Chinese beholden to him in any future struggle.
43
 
 Cumings suggests that, though it is impossible to determine who really started the Korean 
War, three competing “mosaics” provide a possible answer. The Korean peninsula was a 
tinderbox, and could have erupted into war any time from mid-1949 on. The first mosaic is the 
conventional story of the war’s early days, in which the North launches an unprovoked surprise 
attack all along the 38th Parallel. The third is Pyongyang’s version, in which the South began the 
war with a general attack, and the KPA merely responded. The second, which Cumings finds 
more compelling, is a more complicated story in which the ROK Army attacked a town across 
the border (Haeju), and then the North sprung its well-prepared surprise.
44
  
 Others present revisionist ideas, noting for instance that Kim may have feared Rhee 
would follow through on his frequent invasion threats, or that he had to "strike before Rhee could 
stabilize his precarious position through his usual repressive measures”.
45
 Also, Kim may have 





Khrushchev Remembers.  Even if one considers North Korea's attack part of a civil conflict, it 
merely removes the question of Soviet involvement one step. Future Soviet leader Nikita 
Khrushchev, at the time one of Stalin's closest advisors, provides one of the most comprehensive 
Soviet accounts of Soviet policy during the Korean conflict. Khrushchev states that the idea for 
the attack was completely Kim's, and does not try to suggest the South started the war. Kim, he 
says, presented the notion to Stalin, insisting the attack would ignite a spontaneous popular revolt 
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in the South. Stalin seemed interested, but asked Kim to come back with a more detailed plan.  
When Kim returned, Stalin expressed concern about possible American reaction, but apparently 
neither seriously questioned nor discouraged Kim since, as Khrushchev puts it, “no real 
Communist would have tried to dissuade Kim...from his compelling desire to liberate South 
Korea from...Rhee and from reactionary American influence.  To have done so would have 
contradicted the Communist view of the world.  I don't condemn Stalin for encouraging Kim.”
47
 
 He also says the Soviets had been "giving arms to North Korea for some time" and that the 
Soviet air force was at the time protecting Pyongyang, the DPRK capital.
48
 (Halliday and 




 Khrushchev implies that Stalin quickly grasped his miscalculation of the American 
response, and therefore pulled Soviet advisors out of Korea. Stalin would not even allow any 
ranking military advisors to be associated with the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang. Khrushchev 
also mentions Soviet dismay at the absence of revolution in the South and Kim's failure to crush 




Post-Cold War Documentation.  Post-Cold War scholarship has brought to bear previously 
unavailable documentary resources on questions of the war’s origins. The emerging picture 
fleshes out Khrushchev’s points, and indicates that Stalin’s first priority was to avoid military 
conflict with the U.S. It suggests that Kim Il Sung doggedly pressed Stalin to approve the 
invasion, but that the Soviet leader was initially reluctant until he had time to reassess its broader 
implications for Soviet-American and Sino-Soviet relations. Stalin then gave final approval of 
the attack to Mao, in order to solidify Moscow-Beijing ties, avoid direct Soviet participation in 
the conflict, and make the Chinese responsible to support the North Koreans, should America 
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intervene.  
 Sergei Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai are among the first to use these sources 
to paint a more vivid behind-the-scenes picture of pre-war decision making. Stalin’s main prewar 
concern was how a Korean war would affect relations with America, and so Kim was “merely a 
pawn in Stalin’s grand chess game.” Stalin urged an aggressive approach on Kim in spring, 1949, 
but did not call for invasion. Kim repeatedly asked for Soviet approval, and felt that he had to act 
quickly, since guerrilla tactics and negotiations had not worked, and the Rhee government was 
consolidating its political hold on the south.
51
    
 The Goncharov volume contends that the oft-cited December 1949 and February 1950 
Kim-Stalin meetings in Moscow actually did not occur, though Kim continued to press through 
cables and letters for an attack on the South. Stalin sympathized with Kim but, before April, 
1950, did not endorse an invasion. Stalin had hopes of “drawing a line between China and the 
West” but, at the Mao-Stalin summit in December, Mao was even more cautious than the Soviet 
leader. In early 1950, Kim stressed that America was unlikely to intervene, and Stalin began to 
feel that if a war could be concluded quickly, the U.S. would probably not get involved.
52
 
 Kim needed a definitive answer, and so asked for a secret meeting in March, 1950. The 
Korean leader made a strong case, based on four points (likelihood of a quick victory, possibility 
of an uprising in South, guerrilla activities directed at the southern government, and the lack of 
time for the U.S. to participate in the conflict). Stalin “consented” to attack, but wanted 
consultations with Mao to be held before final approval. This made Mao at least partly 




 Kim met Mao in Beijing in May. Chinese Marshall Peng Dehuai reported that Mao 
“disagreed” with the attack, and was more interested in invading Taiwan, but there was no way to 
oppose the Korean operation. China was trying to reunify, and could not deny the Koreans the 
same chance. Mao offered to send troops to the border, but Kim said the war would be over soon 
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and so were not needed. Stalin quickly endorsed Mao’s decision but, anticipating Mao, had 
already stepped up arms and equipment shipments.
54
 Stalin also sent back advisors to guide war 
planning—who did not share any information with the Chinese. Chinese planners were in a bad 
situation, knowing an attack was coming, but not knowing when.
55
 
 As the war began, both Soviet and Chinese leaders assessment of the conflict shifted.  
Stalin mulled long and short-term assessments of possible American responses; Mao supported 
the conflict as a revolutionary struggle, but had doubts about the wisdom of it. He quickly 
concluded that U.S. actions, especially stepped up support for the Nationalist government in 
Taiwan, were aimed at China.
56
 
 The North Korea International Documentation Project documents indicate Stalin’s keen 
interest in Korean affairs both before and during the conflict. He seems especially sensitive about 
antagonizing the Americans and is wary about starting the war. Both Kim and Mao seem eager to 
gain Soviet approval for their actions.
57
 Weathersby summarizes many of these key documents 
in the late 1990s, supporting some of the Goncharov, et al. conclusions and adding new insights. 
 Like Goncharov and his fellow authors, she notes the lengths to which Stalin would go to avoid 
war with the U.S.
58
 Even so, Stalin’s strategic thinking had become more aggressive in 1949, 
and he worried about a possible revival of Japanese militarism. Kim asked Stalin several times 
for permission to attack the South; Stalin only approved in early 1950, and then agreed to send 
necessary arms and equipment. North Korea strongly depended on the Soviets, and the Soviets 
maintained a high level of control over North Korean operations. In fact, the original attack’s 
planning and preparation came from the Soviet Union. Stalin did not intend the attack as a “test” 
of the West’s commitment, and only agreed to sanction it when he thought the U.S. would not 
intervene.
59
 Weathersby adds that Truman was wrong thinking that the Chinese collaborated 
with Moscow in planning the attack. In fact, the Kim-Mao meeting in May, 1950 was just a 
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 Gaddis believes that Stalin felt the prospects for revolutionary advance were stronger in 
Asia than in Europe, where the Soviets had been effectively blocked. He also was concerned 
about the American-sponsored revival of Japan. Added to this was Stalin’s “opportunism,” i.e., 
his propensity to go forward wherever he thought there might not be much resistance.  
Acheson’s ill-considered speech in January, 1950, along with an NSC strategy review the Soviet 
leader may have seen, could have led Stalin to conclude that the U.S. would not intervene in 
Korea. Kim assured Stalin that the U.S. would probably not intervene. Though initially reluctant, 
Mao gave his approval, for two reasons: Kim’s portrayal of Stalin as more upbeat about the 
invasion than he actually was, and Mao’s desire to maintain tenuous Soviet support for his 
projected invasion of Taiwan (Stalin had initially been skeptical of this operation).
61
 
 Jonathan Haslam’s recent Soviet foreign policy history essentially is in accord with 
Goncharov, et al. and Weathersby accounts of the war’s genesis. Kim first put forth the idea of 
the invasion in Moscow in March, 1949, and did not receive any encouragement; Stalin was 
“characteristically evasive” at the meeting. The Soviet Union was not prepared militarily for a 
major war in 1949-1950, and Western analysis assumed that Moscow did not want a major war, 
or even a local one. Stalin wanted Mao to agree to any war, to keep key details from him, and to 
ensure that China would support North Korea if the U.S. intervened.
62
 
 Stalin suspicions of Mao grew toward the end of 1949. He feared Chinese rapprochement 
with the U.S., and so wanted to tie China more closely to the Soviet Union. At the March-April, 
1950 meeting with Stalin, Kim asserted that the U.S. was unlikely to intervene, and stated that he 
needed to attack in late June because delays could compromise security, and the Korean rainy 
season could hinder operations in July. Mao was loath to have a summit with Kim unless the 
Korean leader had Stalin’s support for an invasion. Mao was worried about possible involvement 
of Japanese troops in the conflict. Once Kim assured him that the Soviet leader had approved the 
attack, Mao met with Kim and approved the operation.
63
 
 Perhaps the most mysterious aspect of Soviet behavior during the early part of the war 
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was the absence of a Soviet delegation at the U.N. The Soviets were at the time boycotting the 
U.N. to support PRC demands to take the Chinese seat in the Security Council, but their absence 
may have been a means to avoid responsibility for or connection with the attack.
64
 Free from the 
threat of a Soviet veto in the Security Council, this absence allowed the Americans to pass 
resolutions condemning the DPRK attack as "aggression" and recommending U.N. members 
states, if they wished, to come to the aid of the ROK. In fact, the U.S.-led war effort in Korea was 
to stand as the only use of the U.N.'s collective security function. Revisionists Halliday and 
Cumings think the Soviets may also have hoped American use of the U.N. would suck the U.S. 
into a draining war that would distract attention from Europe, or possibly to destroy the 
effectiveness of the U.N.
65
 However, subsequent Soviet behavior may undermine this notion.  
They quickly seemed to recognize their error in yielding U.N. sanction to the U.S., returning to 
the U.N. after only a few weeks away,
66
 and used the U.N. at least three times to try to end the 
war. The first in July, 1950 was an attempt, through India, to reestablish the status quo ante 
bellum in exchange for PRC representation in the U.N. The U.S. rejected this proposal because it 
still could leave South Korea open to aggression. The second in October, 1950 was a proposal by 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky for withdrawal of foreign troops and a Korea-wide 
election. Since the U.S. was in the midst of its invasion of the North, it also rejected this proposal. 




 Post-Cold War scholars’ overall agreement breaks down on this issue. Gaddis believes 
that Stalin may have kept the Soviet ambassador from attending the U.N. for political-strategic 
reasons. With a U.N. resolution in hand, the U.S. would be less likely to declare war, possibly 
against China, that might trigger Soviet treaty obligations with Beijing.
68
 Vladislav Zubok says 
that Stalin wired the Czech president that the Soviets had deliberately avoided the crucial U.N. 
votes, in order to get the U.S. bogged down in an Asian war. If North Korea failed in its southern 
invasion, China would come to its aid, and a Sino-American war would be good thing because it 
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would allow the Soviets time to rebuild their military.
69
 Haslam disagrees with Gaddis and 
Zubok, and asserts that Stalin realized his mistake in not having a representative at the U.N., and 
sent Ambassador Malik in July to block any further action in the Security Council. Thus, the 
Americans presented their next major resolution in the General Assembly, where they controlled 







 From the beginning of direct U.S. involvement in the war, the Soviets sought both an end 
to the war and preservation of North Korea as a friendly border buffer. When U.S. forces 
approached the Soviet frontier, the latter took precedence; when the two sides settled into a 
grinding stalemate, the former became more important. To Cold War era scholars, Chinese 
involvement in the war was far less ambiguous than that of the Soviets. Chinese strategic 
interests were fairly obvious (though apparently not to the Americans). Intervention came after 
warnings to U.N. forces not to cross the 38th Parallel, and later not to approach the Yalu River.  
Chinese were motivated, first, by desire to repay North Korean help in their revolution (large 
numbers of Koreans served in the PLA during the civil war, and so Mao may have found it 
difficult to deny help to the DPRK), to defend their border, and to supplant Soviet influence in 
Korea. Intervention became a chance to promote Maoist ideology and halt "American 
imperialism.”
71
 They were also alarmed and angered by American linkage of the lingering 
Taiwan problem with the Korean War. They had been preparing to invade Taiwan in June, 1950, 
when the U.S. interposed the Seventh Fleet between Chiang Kai-shek and the PRC, and now 
feared Chiang's forces might be used against the Mainland. Nonetheless, they still sought to 
avoid war until the last moment, moving their forces slowly, continuing to send signals, fading 
away after initial attacks on U.N. forces.
72
 In his classic study, Allen S. Whiting suggests this 
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had to do with “the political importance of intervention in relation to its expected effect on 
U.S.-Japan relations, China's role in Asia, and the security of the regime against subversion or 




  Khrushchev suggests that Stalin was aware of Chinese intentions all along, and felt the 
Chinese could be useful in keeping Western armies away from Vladivostok. Chinese Premier 
Zhou En-lai met Stalin shortly before the Chinese intervention and agreed to give "active 
support" to North Korea.
74
 Stalin apparently decided it would hold Soviet power in readiness to 
prevent attacks on China, while it “shift[ed] the burden of American resentment and hostility 
onto Communist China, and in turn persuade[d] or pressure[d] Peking to hold itself in readiness 
to pull its chestnuts out of the fire.”
75
 Richard C. Thornton goes further, suggesting that Stalin 
saw Korea as a “tar baby” that could tie down China and make it less threatening.
76
 Allen R. 
Millett is more conservative, stating that Stalin wanted to “spread the risks” of the war by 
involving the Chinese.
77
 In the absence of Chinese intervention, Stalin apparently had no plans 
to intervene in any case, even if U.N. forces approached the Soviet border.
78
 However, the 




 Stalin's overriding imperative as the war continued seems to have been avoiding a 
confrontation with the U.S. He was apparently willing to sacrifice the DPRK, if necessary, 
because there is no indication that Soviet intervention on the ground - even under the guise of 
volunteer units - was ever given serious consideration. The Soviets' main role for most of the war 
was to supply equipment to the DPRK and the PRC,
80
 though a squadron of Soviet "volunteer" 
pilots flew MIG-15 jet fighters in combat with U.N. aircraft, to test these new jets and gain 
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experience for their pilots.
81
 However, the Chinese resented Stalin's distancing from the conflict 
and "the paucity of Soviet aid,"
82
 and the Koreans became "extremely bitter about the slowness 
and meagre quantities of Soviet aid" early in the war.
83
 Even on a simple matter such as military 
aid, the Soviets hesitated to expand their involvement. 
 Post-Cold War scholarship has added significantly to the picture of Maoist decision 
making, underlined various contentions of conventional scholarship, but adding more nuance and 
thought-out motivation. Jian Chen suggests that PRC leader Mao Zedong played the dominant 
role in decision making on Korea, and had multiple motives for intervention, most notably 
bolstering the new regime and spreading revolution to neighboring countries.
84
 In the months 
before intervention, Goncharov and his collaborators note, Mao expected eventual Chinese 
involvement, carefully weighed Korea contingencies, and ordered the PLA to prepare for war.  
After the Incheon landing by U.S. forces in September, 1950, Mao felt that the danger to China 
had substantially increased, but the decision to go to war was still difficult for him. As soon as 
U.N. forces crossed the 38th Parallel, it was decided to send “volunteers” to fight in North Korea. 
There was significant resistance to a full commitment within the CCP, but Mao argued that a U.S. 
presence in the north would threaten Chinese and Soviet interests. On October 13, Mao carried 
the day with strong arguments for intervening early, rather than waiting for Kim’s government to 
retreat into China. Stalin reneged on previous promises of support, but the Chinese forged ahead 
with their offensive in North Korea.
85
   
 Gaddis asserts that Mao’s decision to intervene was driven by his assessment of U.S. 
strategic moves. He interpreted the Korean intervention, sending of the U.S. fleet to the Taiwan 
Strait, and aid to the French in Indochina as parts of an American “invasion” of Asia. Mao 
apparently had intended to intervene for some time, but “got cold feet” due to doubts among the 
Chinese leadership. Stalin’s persistent pressure to help the North Koreans, along with promises 
(never fulfilled) of air cover, pushed Mao to decide for the eventual intervention. Stalin was 
prepared for either contingency: a Sino-American war or the fall of North Korea. In neither case 
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would the Soviets participate in the war, and Stalin let Mao decide which one would happen.
86
 
Haslam agrees that Stalin was hedging his bets, preparing for either Chinese intervention or 
complete North Korean collapse. After Incheon, Stalin warned Kim to withdraw his forces north 
and into China, while pressuring Mao to intervene.
87
   
 The North Korea International Documentation Project documents note that Stalin sees a 
prolonged war as useful to the communist cause. The Soviet leader frequently gives Kim Il Sung 
and Mao detailed advice on military tactics and political or negotiating strategy. Stalin’s specific 
war messages include: encouragement of the North to keep fighting after the Incheon reversal, 
approval of training for North Korean pilots (but only in China), acceptance of the basic 
American negotiating position to accept the frontline as the demarcation line, agreement at 
various points to send more advisors and military aid. Also noteworthy is Soviet disbelief of 
frequently stated DPRK claims of biological warfare by U.S. forces in the North.
88
   
Weathersby believes that, above everything, the documents show the lengths to which Stalin 
would go to avoid war with the U.S.
89
 
 The Soviets generally were not happy about the course of the war, and had mixed feelings 
about the conflict throughout. Though the war tied down extensive American forces, and made 
China dependent, it improved Mao's position vis-à-vis the Soviets and weakened Soviet 
influence in North Korea.
90
 Accordingly, though the Soviets wanted peace in Korea, it may not 
have a top priority for them.   
 
 
Negotiations and the End Game 
 By spring, 1951, both the Soviets and Americans felt the situation in Korea had stabilized 
sufficiently to prevent defeat, but neither side seemed able to win an outright victory.
91
 The 
Soviets, along with the Chinese, felt it was now time to seek an end to the war. George Kennan, 
who had just left government, on May 31 met privately with Malik, who expressed his desire for 
"a peaceful solution...at the earliest possible moment," and suggested the Americans contact the 
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Chinese and North Koreans directly. The American embassy in Moscow tried to do this, but was 
twice rebuffed. Malik next gave a speech June 23 advocating negotiations, which Truman 
answered with a speech containing a "cautious overture." U.S. ambassador to Moscow Alan Kirk 
then called on Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko June 27 for clarifications of the 
Soviet position. Gromyko suggested the "belligerents" meet for discussion on the battlefield, and 
confine their talks to military matters. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson decided that U.N. 
commander Matthew Ridgway should call for direct negotiations in Korea. This he did on June 
29, the Chinese immediately accepted, suggesting negotiations begin at Kaesong, just inside the 
Communist lines, on July 10.
92
 
 So began the longest, most frustrating phase of the war, "the talking war.”
93
 After initial 
argument over whether the final armistice should be at the 38th Parallel or the current battle front, 
the Communists accepted in principle the latter by February, 1952. The remaining seventeen 




 As in the war itself, the Soviet Union played an offstage role in the negotiation drama.  
Her successful orchestration of the opening of peace talks resulted from a third major attempt to 
bring the two sides together.
95
 A joint PRC-DPRK team negotiated for the Communist side, but 
the Chinese seem to have dominated their Korean colleagues (the Chinese were eager, and the 
North Koreans reluctant, to talk).
96
 The team apparently cleared, or at least discussed, important 
matters with Moscow. On a number of occasions, the Soviets probably prodded or forced their 
Asian comrades to adopt a particular position. For example, the Communist negotiating team 
wanted to hold out for a settlement at the 38th parallel, but Moscow seems to have pushed them 
to accept the frontline for the ceasefire. The Soviets also occasionally raised political or 
propaganda issues, such as germ warfare, that found their way into the talks.
97
 If the Soviets 
desired a quick end to the conflict, they did not push for it, and Stalin indicated that he thought 
drawn-out negotiations would hurt the U.S. and its allies most. They may have felt that the need 
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to talk was urgent, but actual peace merely desirable.
98
 Weathersby says recent documents 
indicate that when the war settled into a stalemate, Stalin told Communist negotiators to be tough. 
The Soviet leader said that the U.S. had more need for a settlement, and continuing the war 
would keep America bogged down in Asia.
99
  
 By 1952, the peace talks moved to the more neutral site of Panmunjom, might have 
dragged on indefinitely but for two dramatic changes in early 1953. First, Dwight Eisenhower, 
upon taking office as U.S. President in January, "unleashed" Chiang to attack Mainland China (at 
the time only a potent gesture toward China), and began to drop hints that he might use nuclear 
weapons in Korea or China if a satisfactory settlement was not soon reached. Weathersby feels 
that, based on recently released documents, Eisenhower’s nuclear threats had little effect on the 
Communists. Instead, Stalin’s successors were “uncertain” about how to proceed, and wanted to 
end the war as a way to clear the slate with the U.S.
100
 Secondly, and more importantly for the 
Soviets, Stalin died in March. Stalin's successors, an initially unstable collective leadership, saw 
the Korean problem as an irritating burden that they wanted to unload. They also were aware that 
North Korean society was under serious stress because of massive U.S. bombing, and they 
looked with consternation upon the political effects of the war: a massive U.S. military buildup, 
solidification of the NATO alliance, and conclusion of a U.S.-Japan peace treaty, as well as 
American protection of Taiwan, funding of the French war effort in Indochina, and U.S. 
stockpiling of nuclear weapons.
101
 Moreover, the period occasioned the Soviets' own military 
buildup in response to Western moves, and this was having a draining effect on the USSR's 
limited postwar economic resources.
102
  
 Following Stalin's death, events moved quickly. Nominal Soviet leader Georgi Malenkov 
(supported by Stalin deputy Lavrentiy Beria) issued another call for peace, and the collective 
leadership brought back the seasoned V.M. Molotov, who had been removed as Foreign Minister 
by Stalin. After top-level consultations at Stalin's funeral, the Sino-Korean negotiators accepted a 
U.N. proposal to discuss the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. This broke the logjam, and 
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an exchange was agreed upon in April. A general agreement on prisoners was set in May. The 
only remaining issue was Rhee's refusal to accept the nearly completed agreement. The heaviest 
Communist attacks of the war then nearly buckled U.N. lines, and the U.S. reluctantly decided to 
take responsibility for ROK compliance. This final obstacle removed, the two sides signed the 




Conclusion:  the War’s Effect on the Soviets 
 For the Soviet Union, the Korean War was in many ways the wrong war, but it played a 
crucial, yet indirect, role in it. Stalin and the post-Stalinist leadership exhibited classical realist 
thinking about Soviet national interests, i.e., national interests, national security, and 
maximization of national goals took precedence over other foreign policy considerations. 
Whatever his motivations, which apparently centered on both global and regional considerations, 
Stalin at least consented in Kim's attack on South Korea. He probably thought that, despite clear 
risks, the war was likely to yield benefits in both traditional strategic and geopolitical terms. In 
international relations terms, it has been suggested that Stalin was a defensive realist, i.e., seeking 
only sufficient power to maintain the balance of power, so that no other power can endanger 
either the overall international system or a country’s own,
104
 yet the Soviet leader’s realism was 
much more idiosyncratic than this would suggest. Stalin pragmatically, albeit often misguidedly, 
employed any means necessary to protect the territorial integrity of the Soviet homeland.
105
 His 
“paranoia” (and occasional rigidity) about the external environment was manifest by the 1930s, 
and then powerfully shaped by the Soviet Union’s World War II trauma.
106
 In Korea, he took 
special pains to not involve Soviet forces in the war, so as to avoid military conflict with the U.S. 
 Stalin's endorsement of the risky North Korean scheme may also be taken as an illustration of 
normal Soviet foreign policy decision making, the “operational code” outlined by Alexander 
George, i.e., initiating an exploratory action in a fluid context to see what results can be 
obtained.
107
 The code may amount to little more than a combination of classical realism and 
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Marxist-Leninist imperatives, and the leadership styles of post-Stalinist officials differed 
markedly from Comrade Stalin’s approach, but it summarizes common Soviet foreign policy 
approaches. It may have seemed a near-perfect set-up: a swift blow by a proxy without any direct 
Soviet connection. The Soviets would derive all the benefits, and none of the blame.  
 Once it became clear that the Americans would not let the North Koreans get away with 
devouring the South, the overriding imperative became preventing global war (objective 1), or 
even a military confrontation with the U.S. Like China, the USSR did not want U.S. forces on its 
border (objective 2) or the fall of the DPRK (objective 3). Obviously, Objective 1 was more 
important than Objective 2, and thus Objective 2 became more important than Objective 3. 
Preventing global war meant a nearly complete hands-off policy. Keeping U.S. forces away from 
the border necessitated (but could not require) Chinese intervention. North Korean survival was 
desirable, but could be sacrificed to objectives 1 and 2. All this is in keeping with George W. 
Breslauer's scheme of Soviet foreign policy role priorities. Objective 1, then, involved a 
superpower role, Objective 2 the continental power role, and Objective 3 the leader of world 
communist movement role.
108
 In this sense, rational decision making can be seen as the 
overriding factor at work in Soviet decisions related to the development of the Korean conflict 
following the initial attack. Overall, such objectives fit Stalin’s realist foreign policy; to the end, 
he put major foreign policy decisions emphasizing spheres of influence and protection of borders 
above ideological considerations. Unexplained incidents such as the Soviet absence from the U.N. 
Security Council at the time of Kim's attack, or the murkiness of Soviet consultations with Kim, 
may be in part explained by Stalin’s idiosyncratic leadership style.   
 The Korean War was a turning point for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and led to 
the globalization of the Cold War. The Soviets saw the changes brought about in U.S. strategic 
thinking, such as the adoption of NSC-68 and its huge military buildup, as negative outcomes 
and unintended consequences of the war. The Korean War years coincided with Stalin’s final 
years, and began when another communist state--North Korea--took aggressive action 
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semi-independently of Moscow. For the first time, yet another communist state, China, led the 
socialist world in its politico-military response to a major crisis. Stalin’s maneuvering of China 
into the war bound the two communist giants together short-term, and the PRC had no relations 
with the U.S. for over twenty years, but mistrust contributed to the later Sino-Soviet split.  
Soviet and Chinese leaders did not see eye-to-eye on various issues. These included differing 
assessments of Stalin’s reign, whether or not to pursue “peaceful coexistence” with the U.S., and 
the proper way to promote domestic economic development. This sense of mistrust that began 
with Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union in late 1949 boiled over in the late 1950s, leading to the 
Sino-Soviet split in 1962 and a brief border war in 1969. The alliance remained together for 
“negative rather than positive reasons,” but could not hide “underlying friction.”
109
 China's pride 
in fighting superpower America to a stalemate, combined with her perception that she was doing 
the Kremlin's dirty work and not getting much support in return, motivated a more independent 
postwar foreign policy.
110
 The Chinese, along with the North Koreans, were proving themselves 
quite unlike the more docile Communists of Eastern Europe. 
 For a time, the Soviets were forced to focus exclusively on Asia, and for the first time 
Moscow gave significant support to a Communist revolutionary movement in a developing 
country away from its borders, viz., Vietnam. There were to be certain similarities between the 
Korean and subsequent Vietnam Wars, but the Soviets did not make the later American mistake 
of equating them in strategic terms. Once again, though, the Soviets would wrangle with the 
Chinese over the appropriate socialist response to an American war in Asia.
111
  
 Ultimately, the USSR did not derive much tangible benefit from this wrong war. Stalin 
got the worst of both worlds, held responsible for the outbreak of the war, yet castigated for not 
sufficiently coming to the aid of fellow Communists. Ultimately, the Soviets may not have had 
much choice. Stalin's personalist style of decision making, occasional disregard for details, and 
ad hoc probing method made a step-wise approval of Kim's attack possible.  His sensitivity to 
superpower relations ensured that he would not enter the war, but only gradually seek peace.  
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The post-Stalin collective leadership's nervousness about the situation it inherited then forced it 
to quickly wrap up this Asian misadventure.   
 Since the Chinese saved the Kim regime, Soviet influence in North Korea fell off after 
the armistice.
112
 Stalin’s “highhanded, cynical” treatment of North Korea taught Kim “lessons” 
about the need for self-reliance, and warped Pyongyang’s foreign policy throughout the Cold 
War.
113
 In the post-Korean War era, a "Korean triangle" developed, in which the DPRK played 
off Soviet and Chinese influence to gain control of internal affairs and stay independent of her 
two large fraternal neighbors in pursuing an "assertive foreign policy, aimed at Korea's 
reunification under Communist rule."
114
 Kim Il Sung used the post-war environment to purge 
anyone perceived as not completely loyal, including several key figures with ties to the 
Soviets.
115
 Despite the Kim dynasty's continuing desire for reunification, Pyongyang never 
precipitated another major conventional strike south of the DMZ. Today, unification is only 
slightly closer today than when Kim Il Sung launched his risky attack in 1950. Post-Soviet 
Russia maintains cordial ties with the DPRK, but China has gained the preeminent external 
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